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Environmental harm and environmental victims: 
scoping out a ‘green victimology’ 
 
In this paper I intend to discuss the adaptability of victimological study to the 
question of ‘environmental victimisation’. The impact on those affected by 
environment crime, or other environmentally damaging activities, is one that 
has received scarce attention in the mainstream victimological literature (see 
Williams, 1996). The role or position of such victims in criminal justice and/or 
other processes has likewise rarely been topic of academic debate. I have 
recently expanded upon various aspects of this subject and surrounding 
issues at greater length (Hall, 2013) but for the purposes of this article I wish 
to expand specifically on what a so-called ‘green victimology’ might look like, 
together with some of the particular questions and challenges it will face.  
 
The 20th anniversary of the leading international journal in victimological 
thought seems a fitting place to discuss developments in the burgeoning 
study of environmental harm principally because a focus on victimisation 
beyond that which is officially recognised as criminally perpetrated evokes 
arguments original being made at a much earlier point in the history of the 
victims’ movement. A key question raised at an preliminary stage in most 
debates concerning how environmental destruction might fit within the corpus 
of criminology and victimology is whether those harmed by environmentally 
destructive activities are truly victims of crime, given that many polluting 
activities are frequently not only state sanctioned, but in fact are actively 
promoted by states. As noted by Skinnider (2011): 
 
“[M]any environmental disruptions are actually legal and take place with 
the consent of society. Classifying what is an environmental crime 
involves a complex balancing of communities’ interest in jobs and 
income with ecosystem maintenance, biodiversity and sustainability” 
(p.2). 
 
Nevertheless, the expansion of victimology to cover those harmed by such 
‘non-criminal’ activities is far from unprecedented, Pointing and Maguire 
(1988), for example, discuss how the victims’ movement in the US was 
originally driven by a diverse group of advocates concerned with different 
aspects of victimisation in its broadest sense. These ranged from feminists 
and mental health practitioners, to survivors of war and atrocities such as the 
Nazi concentration camps (Young, 1997) and victims of the apartheid regime 
in South Africa (Garkawe, 2004). Divergence has also developed within the 
the (sub)discipline between ‘positivist victimology’, which employs scientific 
methods (such as victimisation surveys) to examine criminal victimisation 
specifically, and ‘general victimology’, which encompasses wider 
victimisations: including war and, of particular relevance to the present 
discussion, natural disasters (Cressey, 1986; Spalek, 2006). Indeed, it was 
only later in the development of victimology that, despite the initial divergence 
of foci and aspirations amongst those within the field, the study of victims of 
(officially recognised) crime took centre stage (Maguire, 1991). Even by this 
point, the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power (still a key inspiration for may recent official documents 
concerning victims of crime) focused specific attention on victims of ‘acts or 
omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws but of 
internationally recognized norms relating to human rights’ (para.18). It is 
notable that this aspect of the Declaration has still received relatively little 
attention compared to the provisions aimed at more ‘traditional’ notions of 
criminal victimisation.  
 
In more recent years the cause of victims of acts which are officially classified 
as non-criminal has been the preserve firstly of zemiology (the study of social 
harms) and of so-called ‘critical victimology’ with its expanded notions of 
victimhood beyond simple, criminal classifications (Hough, 1986; Dignan, 
2004). Hillyard and Tombs (***) have also championed a so-called ‘social 
harms’ approach to criminology and the study of victims, rather than narrowly 
focusing on ‘criminal harms’. In many ways those suffering environmental 
harm fall squarely within the category of “real, complex, contradictory and 
often politically inconvenient victims” (Kearon and Godey, 2007: p.31) with 
which the critical critique is so concerned. This is particularly so given the 
reality that not only do environmental harms often derive from entirely legal 
activities, as noted above, there may in fact be very sound economic and/or 
political justifications for a company or a state to passively allow such 
activities to continue, or even actively promote them (Walters, 2006). Thus, as 
observed some time ago by Schnaiberg (1980), states are often willing to 
undercut environmental concerns to facilitate the ‘treadmill of production’. Of 
course, as noted by Ruggiero and South (2010), such political and economic 
decisions are heavily influenced by power inequalities, which are another key 
feature of the critical school: 
 
“[T]he high status of those causing the most [environmental] harm who 
(like other powerful offenders) frequently reject the proposition that 
criminal definitions should apply to them while constantly striving to 
persuade legislators that the imposition of norms of conduct on them 
would be detrimental to all. Powerful actors whose conduct impacts on 
the environment possess the ready-made rationalisation that a law 
imposing limits to the harm they cause would implicitly endanger the 
core values underpinning economic development and therefore be 
damaging to the collective wellbeing” (p.246). 
 
Nevertheless, even amongst the critical school, victims of environmental 
harms have largely been overlooked in the literature, although the first call for 
the development of what was then turned ‘environmental victimology’ came as 
early as 1996 in an article by Christopher Williams. Williams begins his 
argument by acknowledging the ‘limits of law’ (Williams, 1996: p.200) in 
addressing environmental victimisation and, much like Hillyard and Toombs 
would later follow (albeit in more general terms), notes the “obvious need for 
social justices to parallel formal legal processes” (p.200). Williams calls for a 
move away from prevailing concepts of ‘environmental justice’ (see ***) which 
he views as subjective and swayed by activism in the field’ to embrace 
victimology as a means of addressing environmental victimisations. For 
Williams ‘environmental victims’ are: 
 
“those of past, present, or future generations who are injured as a 
consequence of change to the chemical, physical, microbiological, or 
psychosocial environment, brought about by deliberate or reckless, 
individual or collective, human act or omission” (p.35). 
 
This definition embodies intergenerational justice and, importantly for 
Williams, is grounded on the notion of ‘injury’ rather than ‘harm’. Williams’ 
argument is that this is a more useful starting point for victimologists if the 
goal is to promote the development of working legal systems around 
environmental victimisation, especially in criminal justice, as the concept is 
more objective and measurable than ‘harm’. 
 
It is extremely telling of the state of the victimological literature in this field that 
when White compiled a reader on environmental crime in 2009, the only 
chapter specifically focused on the victims of such crimes was in fact a reprint 
of William’s 1996 work. A further edited collection from White (2010) has no 
specific chapter on victimisation at all, although it does contain a chapter from 
South (2010) who in one section reflects upon the unequal impact of climate 
change on various groups of (usually poor) victims, and the possibility that 
some ‘environmental rights’ are being breached (see ***). Notably this 
discussion contradicts one of William’s views that the impacts of 
environmental harm are more evenly spread between rich and poor. White 
(2011) has more recently dedicated a chapter to environmental victims in 
which he emphasises the socio-cultural context of understanding and 
responding to environmental harm: 
 
“Ultimately the construction of [environmental] victimhood is a social 
process involving dimensions of time and space, behaviours involving 
acts and omissions, and social features pertaining to powers and 
collectivises” (p.122). 
 
As further noted by White, this state of affairs in relation to environmental 
victims reflects “one of the truisms of victimology that being and becoming a 
victim is never socially neutral” (2011: p.111). 
 
Moving towards a ‘green victimology’? 
 
Both Williams (***), and more recently White (***) end their arguments with a 
resolute call for further development of the study of environmental victims and 
victimisation. This paper in effect takes up this challenge by discussing some 
likely parameters of such a field of study and what its key challenges might 
entail. Underpinning much of this debate is the general point that 
environmental crime and environmental victimisation do not sit well with 
traditional models of criminal justice and, therefore, traditional modules of 
victimology which - as critiqued by (***) - have tended in recent years to 
revolve around officially proscribed notions of crime and victimisation. Indeed, 
as noted by *** ‘not much progress’   
 
Conceptually ascribing criminal blame for environmental destructive activities 
is indeed a difficult proposition, even before one begins considering the role of 
the individual or collective groups of victims in such a process. Often it is 
difficult in such cases to ascribe direct (or even indirect) causation between 
the actions/inactions of a specific party (or state) accused of bringing about 
the harm and the undesirable outcomes themselves. Du Rées (2001) has 
commented on this issue in relation to methods of neutralisation employed by 
supervisory agencies concerning environmental crime, whereby any victim(s) 
and/or the harms caused are effectively denied: 
 
“It is often claimed that environmental crimes have no directly or clearly 
defined groups of victims. It is difficult, for example, to connect a specific 
discharge of a prohibited substance to a specific form of damage to the 
environment or to people’s health” (p.649). 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Bell and McGillivray (2008), the extended range of 
perpetrators of environmental crime can seem hopelessly wide: 
 
“A diverse range of individuals and corporate bodies carry out the 
activities that lead to breaches of environmental law, from solo fly-
tippers, to huge multinational corporations” (p.264). 
 
In the absence of a generally recognised right to a clean and unpolluted 
environment (see below) the basis of any criminal liability for such activities 
and their resulting harms at a jurisprudential level is often unclear. Indeed, 
Passas (2005) has highlighted the particular difficulty in relation to cross-
border practices which are legal in one country but not in another: 
 
“Asymmetries in legal definitions and law enforcement enable 
corporations to do what is prohibited at home in other jurisdictions 
without breaking any laws. Processes of globalization have multiplied 
the opportunities for that” (pp.773-774). 
 Although Passas is not primarily concerned here with environmental crime or 
harm, it is clear that the asymmetries he speaks of are precisely what render 
specific parts of the world and specific groups within society especially 
vulnerable to environmental victimisation, a fact that which will be discussed 
in more detail below.  
 
In light of such jurisprudential difficulties, there are plenty of sound arguments 
as to why criminal justice may be ill suited to dealing with environmentally 
destructive activities as a whole, or certainly with environmental victimisation. 
For example, fundamentally the majority of criminal justice systems across the 
world are not accustomed or adapted to deal with ‘mass victimisations’ of the 
kind that are often a feature of environmental offending (***). Furthermore, the 
wide and eclectic scope of possible harms that can be associated with 
environmental victimisation (discussed below) go well beyond those with 
which criminal justice systems are traditionally concerned: or indeed, one 
might argue, can ever be concerned given the necessarily high standard of 
proof that is required to convict defendants in a criminal court. 
 
On a related point, we may be concerned that any encouragement of a 
greater role for criminal justice in matters of environmental degradation might 
well have a net widening effect, bringing more people and corporations within 
the scope of criminal justice (and state control) than ever before (McMahon, 
1990). Here academic victimologists must be wary of setting out to shed light 
on environmental victim only to find them being used to justify retributive 
criminal justice policies, as Elias (**) argues has occurred with other victims of 
crime.    
 
For such reasons some authors, notably Mares (2010), dismiss the idea that 
criminal justice can effectively deal with environmental victims - or indeed that 
law of any kind is capable of doing so - as a misnomer, preferring instead a 
system based on civilising and shaming. The situation appears even further 
removed from traditional criminal justice principles if one approaches the 
issue from a less anthropocentric perspective to consider victimisation to non-
human animals, the ecosystem and so on (see Cazaux, 1999; Zimmerman, 
2003; White ***).  
 
The above points notwithstanding, a key role for any green victimology, it is 
submitted, will lie in unpicking the extent to which formal justice mechanisms 
are incapable of dealing with cases of environmental victimisation and the 
extent to which this alleged incapability in fact reflects cultural reticence 
amongst legal practitioners and others involved in delivering those justice 
systems. Victimologists have of course long been concerned with the extent 
to which criminal justice practitioners - as a matter of occupational culture - 
construct ideas of their roles within the criminal justice system, and whether 
such roles include consideration for more traditional victims of crime 
(Shapland, ** **; Hall, 2009). For its part, in a review of the English and Welsh 
criminal justice system’s handling of environmental crime (in which, notably, 
no reference to victims was made), the House of Commons Environmental 
Audit Committee (2004) emphasised a lack of awareness of such issues 
amongst judges and prosecutors rather than any fundamental incompatibility 
with criminal justice per se. In the same report, the English Law Society 
labelled this state of affairs as ‘clearly unacceptable’, indicating that the 
problem lay with attitudes amongst the legal professions rather than with the 
law itself.  
 
One particularly stark example of the impact of occupational cultures within a 
legal system on the plight of environmental victims can be drawn from the oil 
extraction taking place in the Nigerian Delta. Here, Ebeku (2003) argues 
judges have traditionally disregarded the position of environmental victims in 
favour of the economic interests of the state. Although Ebeku’s discussion of 
this issue is mainly based on civil courts, the point concerning judges as the 
ultimate ‘gatekeepers’ to the justice system is well made. Ebeku (2003) has 
also argued that it is the culture of judges in Nigeria that needs to change in 
this regard, and is in fact slowly doing so. Kotzé and Paterson (2009) have, 
likewise, emphasised the key significance of differing attitudes taken by 
judiciaries across different jurisdictions to environmental governance. Bell and 
McGillivray (2008) have further argued that the operation and enforcement of 
a great deal of environmental regulation and criminal law at present depends 
very much on the working practices and cultures of enforcement agencies. 
 
Identifying environmental victims and the heterogeneous nature of 
environmental harm 
 
The argument that all victims of crime are not the same, do not react in the 
same way (or to the same timetable) to their victimization and require different 
services and support from criminal justice and other agencies is another 
familiar tenant of mainstream victimology (Shapland and Hall, 2007), and one 
which may apply to an even greater extent to environmental victims. 
Theoretical musings, or even parallels drawn with more traditional and well-
studied victims groups are, for this reason, insufficient as a basis for the 
continuing development of green victimology. As with other areas of 
victimisation, the voices and views of these victims of environmental harm 
have largely remained absent from the relevant literature, and indeed from 
policy debates. Given that almost no empirical research has been carried out 
which takes into account the perspective of environmental victims themselves, 
green victimology will face the arduous challenge of developing 
methodological approaches to finding, sampling and drawing data from this 
diverse ‘group’. 
 
The principal difficulty here lies in the apparent heterogeneous nature of 
environmental victimisation. In one of the few in-depth (literature-based) 
studies on this issue Skinnider (2011) extrapolates the following broad 
characteristics of environmental victims: 
 
(i) The victims are not always aware of the fact that they have been 
victimised; 
 
(ii) The victimisation is often delayed with the victim becoming aware 
of the victimisation much later after; 
 
(iii) Victims are not sure about who victimised them or who exactly is 
responsible; 
 
(iv) The victimisation is often serious not so much because any 
individual victim was seriously affected, but because numerous victims 
were affected by the crime; and 
 
(v) Victimisation can often include repeat offences. 
 
Skinnider goes on to postulate that environmental victims can be classified by 
a number of different typologies including: by wrongful act; by the nature of 
the harm; by the extent of the damages suffered; by the scope of the harm or 
by the perpetrator(s) of that harm. Expanding on the ‘nature of the harm’ 
typology, I have previously argued that such harm may fall into four broad 
categories: impacts on health; economic impacts; impacts on victims’ security 
and social/cultural impacts (Hall, 2013). Needless to say however these 
classifications in all likelihood represent only the tip of the iceberg.  
 
What is clear about environmental victims themselves is that the overriding 
evidence now points to endemic inequality in the distribution of environmental 
harms at local, national and global levels (Dobson, 1998). This inequality is in 
part geographically grounded. So, for example, the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) acknowledges the particular 
vulnerability of “low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-
lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and 
desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous 
ecosystems” (***). This notwithstanding, it is important that a focus on the 
inequalities of environmental harm fostered by physical geography does not 
distract us from the more complex - social, economic and cultural - aspects of 
environmental victimisation. The unequal distribution of environmental 
degradation as a whole has been commented on by South (2010), who sees 
this as reflecting wider tendencies towards ‘social exclusion’ that have long 
been a topic of research and discussion in mainstream criminology (Byrne, 
1999). In relation to environmental victimisation, Lee (2009) has summarised 
the situation in the following terms: 
 
“Poor people are usually excluded from the environmental decision- 
making process, and once a policy is made, they are usually powerless 
to change it” (pp.3-4). 
 
In sum, therefore, a further key challenge for any green victimology will lie in 
identifying the nature of environmental victimisation itself and the people 
(businesses, countries) affected. Perhaps to a greater degree than for many 
other kinds of victimisation, this is unlikely to be a cognate grouping.  
 
The human rights perspective 
 
As a concept, ‘rights’ for victims of traditional crimes is now fairly well 
established, at least on a rhetorical level, in a number of national and 
international instruments (***). Such rights include a number of important 
service rights - which have been largely uncontroversial (JUSTICE, 1998) - 
and also a developing assortment of procedural rights of participation within 
justice systems, which have attracted much fiercer debate (Ashworth, ***).  
Human rights have thus become one of the cornerstones of the discussion 
going on around tradition victims of crime (as well as criminal justice in 
general) and, as such, will prove a vital component of green victimology as 
well. This is all the more certain given the transnational nature of many 
environmental harms and the likely involvement of the international legal 
order, under which human rights are at present one of the few mechanisms by 
which individuals (rather than states) can seek recognition. Indeed, the move 
towards greater recognition of human rights within the international legal order 
(including the area of international environmental law) has been heralded by 
(***) as ‘the most significant***’. 
 
As noted by Jackson (1990), talk of rights within more traditional victimological 
areas is dominated by ‘balance’ rhetoric: chiefly concerning the balancing of 
victims’ rights with those of offenders. The same balancing exercise will need 
to be addressed by green victimologists as well
 
although, in this case, there 
may well be more complex issues at stake. Whilst green victimology must 
tackle the same concerns about (environmental) offenders being prejudiced 
by more victim involvement in the justice system (the so-called ‘zero-sum 
game’ (****)) environmental crime also raise tensions between the economic 
needs of the broader community or the state as a whole and smaller groups 
or individual citizens within those communities (***). Furthermore, to redress 
environmental harm for some victims may lead to forced changes in industrial 
practices, potentially putting other victims out of work1. Indeed, it seems likely 
that, much more so than for many traditional crimes, the ‘balance’ to be struck 
in relation to environmental crime and justice may actually lie between one set 
of victims’ rights and those of another group of victims, or potential victims: 
now or in the future.  
 
If green victimology is to adopt the language of rights it must also, it is 
submitted, address another key set of questions raised by more traditional 
branches of victimology: concerning the enforceability of such rights. Here 
there are definite parallels to be drawn between the fledging recognition of 
rights for environmental victims and those rights ascribed to more traditional 
victims in that the enforcement mechanisms attached to these ‘rights’ remain 
in most cases markedly underdeveloped and lacking true compulsive 
authority. For example,   
 
Compliance Committee of the Aahrus UNECE Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.  
 
In fact the broad consensus at present amongst international environmental 
lawyers appears to be that no definitive right to an unpolluted, green 
environment can yet be said to exist in international law (***). Rather, the most 
progressive developments concerning rights for environmental victims so far 
have come about as a result of interpreting existing, well established, rights - 
such as the right to privacy and the right to a home life - to include 
environmental harms: especially by the European Court of Human Rights 
(****). Nor in most case can existing ‘rights’ for victims of crime be easily 
applied to victims of environmental harm given that the definition of victims 
employed in most case is often purposely narrow (****). That said, a more 
progressive example comes from the US, where 
 
***** 
 
 
                                            
1
 Although see ** for a contrary view 
It is clear therefore that, like victimology as a whole, the study of 
environmental victimisation and environmental victims will inevitably to raise 
many questions concerning the nature and scope of such victims’ ‘rights’ 
(needs, entitlements, legitimate expectations and so on) and how those rights 
relate to the rights of others: including the rights of corporations, states and 
other victims. Green victimology therefore needs to apply itself to 
understanding these developments and how they might be applied to wider 
groups of environmental victims. 
 
The need for an interdisciplinary approach 
 
By expanding here on the characteristics and challenges of a ‘green 
victimology’ there is of course a danger that this paper will be viewed as 
proposing a siloed approach to the study of environmental harm and its 
victims. That is to say, promoting an excusive or rigidly defined discipline or 
subdiscipline of study. In fact however a key aspect of any success study of 
environmental victimisation has to be a strong interdisciplinary, and indeed 
inter-sectorial, component. The virtues of an interdisciplinary approach are of 
course widely touted throughout the social and physical sciences (see 
Matthews and Ross, 2010), and for good reason. Drawing from a variety of 
sources and perspectives almost inevitably provides a deeper understanding 
of any given subject of the research exercise as well as providing the scope 
for transposing ideas and solutions between subject areas (see Lury and 
Wakeford, 2012). The virtues of interdisciplinary approaches are also well 
recognised by criminologists (Walsh and Ellis, 2007) and by victimologists 
specifically (Dupont-Morales, 1998). Indeed, at the time of writing the British 
Society of Criminology is preparing to host summer conference under the title 
‘challenging disciplinary boundaries within criminological discourses’. 
 
The study of environmental victimisation draws on a complex array of data, 
ideas and practices from across the social and physical sciences. It calls into 
question the interface between science and law, which Houck (2003) 
describes as a “tale from a troubled marriage” (p.1926). Economic matters are 
clearly raised (***). Perhaps more subtly, economic impacts of environmental 
victimisation are often inherently linked with more cultural and social factors: 
at which point we move into the domains of sociology and anthropology. 
Thus, the loss of the fishing industry in the Maldives due to sea level rises 
(caused, it now seems fairly certain, by climate change (***)) is, it is 
submitted, as much a tale of cultural destruction as it is of financial loss and 
therefore victimologists require the input of cultural experts in order to fully 
appreciate and incorporate such ideas. Studies of environmental victimisation 
also inevitably touch upon healthcare issues (**), the politicisation of the 
‘green agenda’ (**) and the provision of insurance (***). I have argued 
elsewhere that a key component of any ‘green victimology’ is the close 
interaction between victimologists and international legal scholars (and 
practitioners), environmental pollution so often constituting a cross-border 
issue (**). That said, given the breath of possible contributors and 
perspectives relevant to the debates concerning environmental victimisation, 
the idea that law (much less criminal law) can or should constitute the sole 
solution to the problems of environmental victimisation is surely wrong.  
 
A ‘green victimology’? 
 
In the 21st century issues pertaining to the environment, climate change and 
atmospheric pollution have become persistent and inexorable social issues 
attracting study and analysis from across the physical and social sciences 
(***). As yet however victimologists have largely ignored in their theorising the 
plight of those harmed by the destructive effects of these processes and 
events, even when there is evidence that they are man-made. Nevertheless, 
the scope of officially recognised ‘environmental crime’ is growing (***) such 
that, even if we restrict ourselves to official notions of criminal victimisation the 
time has surely arrived for more detailed study of these issues amongst 
victimologists. 
 
The aim of the present paper is a modest one: being largely to set out some 
key issues and questions posed by the study of environmental victims and the 
directions such study might take. If nothing else, the above discussion has 
highlight the complexity of these issues although, interestingly, many of the 
questions raised have actually been extensions of the challenges faced by 
victimologists for some time. So, from the outset, we have seen that any 
green victimology needs to fully appreciate and emphasise the heterogeneous 
nature of ‘environmental harm’ and ‘environmental victims’. Even in relation to 
traditional notions of criminal victimisation academics, and certainly policy 
makers, have been in danger of treating ‘victims’ as if they were a uniform 
group when in fact we know that crime impacts upon different people in 
different ways and at different times. If anything, the above discussion 
suggests that the breadth of likely impacts may be even wider in the area of 
environmental harm. 
 
The second key conclusion to be drawn from the above is that a green 
victimology is by its nature necessary a critical victimology. It is submitted that 
the social, political and economic influences on the identification and 
recognition of ‘illegal’ or ‘harmful’ acts and omissions necessitates 
fundamental questions being asked of what any given criminal justice system 
does and does not accept as an ‘environmental crime’ and thus an 
‘environmental victim’. State interests clearly play a large role in this labelling 
process, as do powerful corporate and economic interests within the state. 
The situation on the Nigerian Delta, discussed above, is a prime example of 
the resulting victimisation that occurs when these interest combine and are 
prioritised over and above those of individuals and communities. This 
interplay of corporate and state interests of course effects not just what 
environmental crimes (or harms) are committed, but the very definition of such 
‘official crimes’ in the first place. This critical approach is in fact consistent with 
developments seen in may jurisdictions of defining victims by the harm they 
endure rather than through set legalistic categories (Hall, 2010) and thus 
represents another extension to debates already occurring within 
victimological circles rather than a completely novel area of concern.  
 
Also expanding upon existing debates in more mainstream victimological 
literature, green victimologists need to consider carefully the advent of human 
rights, including environmental rights and intergenerational rights (***), if they 
are to offer a fully reasoned view of this form of victimisation. It is submitted 
that such an analysis will be largely impossible without close cooperation with 
human rights experts, human rights layers and international legal scholars. 
This returns me to my final point concerning interdisciplinarity. Whilst arguably 
all areas of study benefit from an interdisciplinary approach, the breadth of 
issues from both the physical and social sciences raised by environmental 
victimisation, it is submitted, make such interdisciplinarity an essential (not 
merely desirable) component of green victimology. Furthermore, this must 
constitute true interdisciplinarity rather than multidisciplinarity, with synergies 
being drawn between the knowledge and methods used by quite diverse 
groups of researchers.   
 
Finally, the most notable absence from the vast majority of work carried out 
relating to environmental victimisation so far is the voice of environmental 
victims themselves. Given the heterogeneous nature of this (non) group, the 
methodical challenges of identifying and drawing data from those harmed by 
environmentally damaging activities (whether or not officially defined as 
‘criminal’) may prove the greatest challenge to green victimology of all. The 
challenge must be met however if we are to avoid the charge so often levied 
at states and criminal justice systems by victimologists of all descriptions: 
proceeding in a manner that at best assumes and at worst ignores real 
victims’ views and needs. 
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